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The article evaluates the usefulness and shortcomings of agency theory as a framework 
for discussing the future of Norwegian agricultural cooperatives. The first argument is 
that agency theory ignores the significance of the traditional collective thinking in Nor-
wegian agricultural cooperatives. In this respect, agency theory is incomplete and its 
explanatory power is low. The second point is that, nevertheless, the value of applying 
agency theory as a conceptual tool may increase in the close future, due to the emerging 
of novel industrial strategies and new cooperative forms. Some of the crucial agency-
problems may come to the forefront, and increasingly imprint the agenda of Norwegian 
agricultural cooperatives. 
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Students of agricultural cooperatives are confronted with a diverse body of theoretical 
and methodological frameworks. Recently, the new organisational economics (Barney 
and Ouchi, 1986) has grown in popularity. This term covers the fresh theoretical contri-
butions to organization theory from economics, among which transaction cost econom-
ics and agency theory are two core disciplines. Judged by the increasing number of 
scholarly contributions, both perspectives seem to be on its way up as a preferred ana-
lytical framework in the studies of cooperatives (Harte, 1997. Ollila, 1989. Nilsson, 
2000). However, the conceptual and theoretical explorations have not been followed up 
by the same richness of empirical studies. In order to assess the value and shortcomings 
of the new analytical options, more empirically based studies of cooperatives based on 
agency theory and transaction cost economics are welcome. The purpose of this paper is 
to evaluate the usefulness and shortcomings of agency theory as a framework for ana-
lysing the future of Norwegian agricultural cooperatives. Focus is set on the conditions 
under which the agency problems are likely to be accentuated in cooperative organiza-
tions. My first major argument is that agency theory ignores the significance of the tra-
ditional collective thinking in Norwegian agricultural cooperatives. In this respect, 
agency theory seems to be incomplete and its explanatory power is low. The second 
point to be advanced is that the value of applying agency theory as a conceptual tool is 
likely to rise in the close future, due to the emerging of novel industrial strategies and 
new cooperative forms. 
The article proceeds as follows: First, agency theory is presented in a nutshell ver-
sion. Thereafter, the usefulness and weaknesses of the agency theory as a framework for 
discussing the Norwegian agricultural cooperatives is assessed. A short multilevel 
analysis is conducted, directed towards environmental changes, as well as changes in 
organization structure and membership values of Norwegian cooperatives. 
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Agency theory addresses problems within organizations where ownership and leader-
ship are separate. The theory is concerned with the survival of organizations in which 
important decision agents do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects of their 
decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1986). Hence, agency theory analyses organisations in 
terms of conflicts of interest between principals and agents. A principal-agent relation-
ship arises when a principal contracts with an agent to perform some tasks on behalf of 
the principal. The principal delegates authority to the agent, and the welfare of the prin-
cipal is affected by the choices of the agent.  
The situation to which agency theory devotes most interest is characterized by differ-
ential information and differential risk aversion. The agent is assigned to make, modify 
or cancel contracts with a party in the principal¶s name. Consequently, the agent is in 
position to make independent decisions regarding issues that affect the wealth of the 
principal. The relationship between both parties can be defined by contract, but it may 
be difficult for the principal to prevent the agent from acting in the agents¶ own interest, 
and not in the interests of the principal. The agent benefits from certain degrees of free-
dom when accomplishing his tasks for the principals.  
Agency relations can be found both between firms (for instance franchising and li-
censing) and within firms (for instance manager vs. subordinate, employer vs. em-
ployee, members vs. management of a cooperative). Agency theory is concerned with 
those situations in which the agency relation is problematic. The theory emphasis that 
the relation between the principal and the agent is complex since no contract is perfect, 
and because contracts are costly to draft, maintain and follow up. Barney and Hesterly 
(1996) summarise that the delegation of decision-making authority from principal to 
agent is problematic under three conditions: when the interests of principal and agent 
diverge, when the principal cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor the actions of the 
agent, and when the principal cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor and acquire the 
information which is available to or possessed by the agent.  
Control costs occur because the principal must use resources to direct and control the 
agent. This is done by establishing a contract and by controlling and ensuring the fulfil-
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ment of the contract. Since the agent has the freedom to make independent decisions, 
there is some risk that he will not manage the organisation in a fashion that best benefits 
the principal. The principal has rights to the surplus created by the organisations activi-
ties (residual rights), but the agent is able to direct the organisation so that the surplus of 
the organisation is influenced. Two generic problems may occur: moral hazard (hidden 
actions), and adverse selection (hidden information) (Arrow, 1985). Moral hazard in-
volves situations in which the actions of the agents are either hidden from the principal 
or costly to observe. It is either impossible or costly for the principal to fully monitor 
the actions of the agents. Stockholders or directors might find it prohibitively costly to 
fully monitor the behaviour of their top management team. The employment relation in 
general is one in which effort and ability are difficult to observe. Agency problems may 
also involve adverse selection. The agent possesses information that is unobservable or 
costly to obtain for the principal. Consequently, principals cannot fully ascertain 
whether or not their interests are best served by the decisions of the agents. Guidelines 
may be spelled out and the agent may to some extent be monitored, but the agency rela-
tionship is nevertheless characterised by the freedom to independently determine activi-
ties and contracts.  
Clearly, contracts are central in agency theory. The essential function of the firm is to 
mediate individual contractors. Organisations are regarded as legal fictions that serve as 
a nexus for a set of contracting relationships between individuals. However, not all 
types of contracts are equally important. Following Fama and Jensen (1986), two types 
of contracts are of particular interest in organizations; namely the contract that regulates 
the residual right and the contract by which the decision processes are designed. The 
right to the residual claim is defined as the right to the net cash flow from the firm after 
all other claims have been met. The person with the residual right should also bear the 
risk to remain without compensation if the net cash flow does not allow for any com-
pensation. This residual risk is defined as the difference between stochastic inflows of 
resources and promised payments to agents. The residual risk is borne by those who 
contract for the rights to the net cash flow. 
Fama and Jensen also hold that the way the organizations allocate the steps of the de-
cision process between agents is important in explaining the survival of the organiza-
tions. According to agency theory, the overall solution to the agency problems is to set 
up a system of efficient financial rewards. These monetary incentives must specify how 
the principal can align his own interests with the interests of the agent, as well as how 
the principal can direct and control the agent. 
Agency theory adds something valuable to our knowledge of the cooperative form. Tra-
ditionally, students of cooperatives have conceptualised this organization form in one of 
three alternative ways (Sosnick, 1960): 
As vertical integration of otherwise independent actors  
As one independent company, with strong resemblance to investor-owned companies 
As a coalition of actors, which substitute collaboration for independent competition.  
 
Of these, the coalition-perspective pays most attention to the relation and interplay be-
tween the members and their common unit, in terms of the distribution of incomes, 
costs rights and burdens among members. The two other definitions set focus on the 
mechanisms by which the cooperatives¶ total incomes are generated (Kaarle-
hto,1956.Staatz, 1987). The merit of the coalition perspective is to address distribution 
issues also. Here, cooperatives are conceived of as coalitions of different parties with 
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interests that sometimes conflict and sometimes coincide. Focus is also set on the mem-
bers¶ incentives and motivation to remain members.  
Agency theory is capable to significantly extend the coalition perspective. The theory 
contributes to a more advanced discussion of the relation between the members (the 
many small principals) and their cooperative (the agent). However, agency theory tends 
to be critical with respect to the efficiency of the cooperative form, and this critique is 
multifaceted. Many fundamental problems are assumed to be inherent in the cooperative 
form; such as the problem of common ownership, the horizon problem, the portfolio 
problem, the follow-up problem and the decision maker problem (Nilsson, 2000. Hake-
lius, 1996. van Bekkum,1997).  
We shall now briefly present selected parts of the critique, as a prelude to the follow-
ing question: Under what conditions are the agency problems likely to represent a sig-
nificant problem for producer cooperatives and their members? Through this discussion, 
a set of conditions is proposed, which trigger a discussion of the relevance and signifi-
cance of agency problems in Norwegian agricultural cooperatives.  
From the agency perspective, the fact that the equity capital is collectively owned 
(unallocated), inhibits both the efficiency of the cooperative and the fairness in the 
treatment of members. The individual member has no direct or personal control over his 
respective part of the unallocated capital. The capital is in everybody¶s hands, but not in 
anyone¶s hands. Therefore, agency theory assumes that the rational member will ques-
tion why (s)he should engage in issues (s)he can not impact. It would normally be more 
rational for the individual member to engage in matters and organisations that they can 
more easily influence. Not surprisingly, cooperative members are expected to become 
apathetic (Nilsson, 2000).  
According to the agency perspective, the horizon problem emerges in cooperative 
organisations for two causes: First, members are expected to be predominantly occupied 
with shortsighted perspectives on their cooperative membership. They tend to think and 
behave myopically. Here-and-now actions dominate a strategic, long-term perspective. 
Second, residual rights are not tradable. The individual members¶ right to a fair propor-
tion of the cooperative residual is not tradable. Agency theory argues that a system of 
tradable owner shares will overcome the horizon problem.  
The portfolio problem is related to the horizon-problem, but set focus on the mem-
bers¶ variety of risk/reward-profiles rather than the diversity of time horizons. As long 
as cooperative members have different time horizons, there will exist different view-
points with respect to the risk/reward-profile of the cooperative. Following agency the-
ory, all investors should have an investment portfolio that reflects the members¶ pre-
ferred trade-off between risk and reward. Agency theory is critical to the cooperative 
form since an efficient allocation of this type is unattainable in cooperative organi-
zations. The cooperative organisation lacks a trading system that allows the members to 
end up with an investment portfolio that corresponds to their preferred risk/reward-
profile.  
The follow-up problem and the decision-making problem stem from the fact that 
in a situation where members are increasingly diverse and specialised, they may gradu-
ally loose their interests in overall strategic issues in the cooperative. Diversity and 
fragmentation may inhibit active participation. If certain groups of members experience 
that the cooperative works insufficiently hard to promote their specific interests com-
pared to the interests of other member groups, their engagement and commitment to the 
cooperative is likely to decrease. Moreover, active member participation may be less 
attainable in large cooperatives than in small ones. The conditions for trust-building are 
more demanding in large, impersonal organisations than in smaller organisations where 
face-to-face contacts play a major role (Borgen, 1998). In very large cooperatives, it is 
more complicated to get access to relevant information, less natural for the rank-and-file 
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member to engage in strategic issues, and more complicated for members to identify 
with the cooperative. 
When is this critique relevant? As argued by Nilsson (2000), the agency-problems can 
appear as more or less problematic, depending on several conditions. First, one factor 
which can impact the extent and strength of the agency problems, is the degree of ho-
mogeneity within the body of members. If members are literally equal and have pre-
cisely the same business interests, the agency problems listed above (unallocated equity, 
horizon, portfolio etc.) are not very likely to unfold. When members have equal inter-
ests, they will probably accept that the unallocated cooperative resources are used 
jointly and severally. Agency problems will be more accentuated if the body of mem-
bers is highly fragmented; members pursue multiple business strategies, and experience 
conflicts of interests. Hence, the more homogenous the members, the more negligible 
the agency problems are. 
Second, the smaller the joined assets, the more negligible are the agency problems 
(Nilsson, op.cit). Relatively small amounts of money should imply less controversy than 
larger amounts. In other words, whether or not unallocated equity represents a strategic 
and political issue in the cooperative may relate to the absolute size of the financial con-
tributions of the members. The less the financial contribution from members, the more 
negligible are the agency problems in cooperative organizations.  
Third, agency problems do not unfold when newcomers contribute to increased pro-
duction volume, with the consequence that the cooperative thereby comes in position to 
reap economies of scale which would otherwise be out of reach for the collective (Nils-
son, op.cit). New members act as free riders, in the sense that they undeniably benefit 
from the existing assets of the firm. Nevertheless, for the established members it can be 
economically rational to allow new members to join without paying a fee. A related 
point is that, given that operations reduce members¶ transaction costs and that members 
have low internal transaction costs, the agency problems are less likely to severely chal-
lenge the coherence of the cooperative. If the membership is homogenous and if the co-
operative firm focuses on operations that significantly reduce members¶ transaction 
costs, the investments of the cooperative are made to profit all members. Their joint 
benefit is that transaction costs are reduced through the membership. Ideally, all mem-
bers benefit from all operations in the firm, and therefore also from all investments. 
Given these conditions, the critique from agency theory (the collective capital is inflexi-
ble and that owner-shares are not transferable) is less relevant. Hence, the third condi-
tion is that if the co-operative firm operates solely with those activities that lead to re-
duced transaction costs for members, agency problems are more likely to be negligible. 
The closer the cooperative activities are to the operations of the members, the more neg-
ligible are the agency problems. 
Fourth, the more the members are committed to the values and strategies of their co-
operative, the less likely it is that the agency problems will unfold. As already indicated, 
this type of commitment will probably increase the more homogenous the members are. 
Consequently, the fourth condition is that the more involved, engaged and committed 
the members are, the more negligible are the agency problems. 
To sum up, agency problems are likely to be negligible under the following condi-
tions:  
The members are relatively homogenous. 
The financial contributions from members to their cooperative are relatively small. 
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The activities of the cooperative are close to the operations of the members, so that 
the activities contribute substantially to solve the transaction cost problem of the 
members. 
The members are involved, engaged and committed to the collective thinking and 
strategies of their cooperative. 
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Now, the task at hand is to explore the relevance of agency theory in Norwegian agri-
cultural cooperatives, based on the conditions listed above. The discussion is at three 
levels of analysis; institutional environment (particularly emphasising the cultural heri-
tage and political-institutional arrangements), the organisation structure, and members¶ 
values and strategies. My approach is to distinguish between two historical epochs; the 
period from approx. 1950 through 1990, and the period after 1990. 
A natural point of departure is the cultural heritage and the corporatist nature of Norwe-
gian agricultural cooperatives. These cooperatives have for a long time been permeated 
and characterised by collective and anti-authoritative thinking. Hallenstvedt (1996) pre-
sents the rich diversity of cooperative and popular organisations that grew up in Norway 
from the early 18th century. The voluntary organisations were in different sectors (farm-
ing, labour relations, Christian life, teetotalism), but shared an anti-authoritative and 
collective thinking. They all engaged in tasks to which the state did not pay sufficient 
attention (Steen, 1948). Hans Nilsen Hauge (born in 1771, died in 1824) was particu-
larly influential as a catalyst for the early cooperative movement in Norway. He chal-
lenged the ruling authorities and the strictly regulated feudal economy at that time, and 
particularly the royal privileges that inhibited the populace from benefiting from active 
involvement. His approach was not only to address the critique rhetorically, but also to 
engage in practical work to realise the visionary thinking. He actively engaged to initi-
ate and develop small-scale cooperative units, decades before the Rochdale pioneers. 
Nilsen Hauges masterpiece was to link anti-authoritative religious life and democratic 
business organisations for small-scale farmers. Obviously, Nilsen Hauge represented a 
significant threat to the ruling authorities. He was imprisoned for several years, but his 
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ideas survived. The locally founded farmer cooperatives were gradually integrated into 
a regional and national network of cooperatives. There are several reasons why these 
collective ideas diffused rapidly; the even production structure, the small-scale and geo-
graphically dispersed farms, and the small social differences between farmers. Such 
conditions laid the ground for the evolvement and popularity of egalitarian ideas. The 
more specific glue of the early cooperative movement was the obvious advantages of 
joint action for small scale-members in order to cope with poor treatment from political 
authorities, purchasers and middlemen. Within the group of founding members, neither 
the portfolio-problem, the horizon-problem, the decision-problem or other agency prob-
lems challenged the coherence of the cooperative. The members were homogenous, 
their financial contributions were modest, the activities of the cooperative were close to 
the operations of the members, and the members were involved, engaged and committed 
to the collective thinking and strategies of the cooperative. This cultural heritage con-
trasts to the premises for the critique that is addressed towards the cooperative form 
from the agency theory.  
These remarks refer to the specific conditions in the very start of the cooperative 
movement in Norway. Some decades later²around the 1930¶s²the political-
institutional framework of Norwegian agriculture contributed significantly to maintain 
the egalitarian character of the Norwegian agricultural cooperatives. The corporatist 
governance model was developed and was at its peak around the mid-1980¶s. One fea-
ture of this governance model is that all eligible farmers were offered the right to deliver 
their products to the producer cooperatives. Since the 1930¶s, the Norwegian agricul-
tural cooperatives have evolved within the political framework of a nationally con-
trolled production of primary foodstuffs. The Norwegian cooperatives have followed a 
co-evolutionary pattern (Baum and Singh, 1994). The institutional environment of the 
cooperatives, which predominantly exist of other political and economic organisations, 
has been heavily influenced by the cooperatives themselves. It has been taken for 
granted that the relevant market was defined as the domestic market, with only minor 
space for imports and exports. For decades, the Norwegian agricultural cooperatives 
operated within the boundaries of a strictly regulated market and an advanced regulatory 
regime. The political and economic protection was the result of an intimate interplay 
between the political authorities and the cooperative organizations (R¡kholt and 
Borgen, 1998).  
To sum up, the agricultural cooperative movement in Norway benefits from a collec-
tively oriented cultural heritage. The cooperative form has fitted well into the overall 
socio-economic structure of Norwegian agriculture. Under these conditions, little room 
has been left for the agency problems to develop and imprint the operations of Norwe-
gian agricultural cooperatives. Since the early 1990¶s, however, a novel regulatory re-
gime has been in the making, more in tune with the general libertarian ideas upon which 
the European Economic Community is based. More attention has been paid to competi-
tiveness and individual freedom at the expense of egalitarianism and solidarity. The 
advantages of free international trade are more highlighted than before. Traditional 
regulatory instruments are replaced by measures that more explicitly motivate innova-
tion and entrepreneurship. The expected outcome is an increasing amount of mergers 
and joint operations, but also an increasing exit rate of farmers. The new institutional 
environment challenges the cooperative owners to form new competitive strategies and 
organisational forms.  
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The abovementioned changes in the institutional environment can be traced more dis-
tinctively at the organizational level. For decades, the corporatist governance structure 
of Norwegian agricultural has substantially influenced the activities and structure of the 
cooperatives. A close interplay has developed between the significant actors in the do-
mestic environment (political authorities, the farmers unions) and the cooperatives 
(R¡kholt and Borgen, 1998). The agricultural cooperatives were given the mandate to 
implement the national agricultural policy. However, the organization structure of Nor-
wegian cooperatives is now in a process of rapid transition. The agency problems were 
largely negligible until the 1990¶s, but may become more influential under the current 
conditions. The new organizational characteristics may be clarified by means of the two 
images of cooperative organizations suggested by van Bekkum et.al. (1997), namely 
countervailing power cooperative and entrepreneurial cooperative. Since the first coop-
eratives were launched in Norwegian agriculture and up to approx. 1990, they have es-
sentially functioned as a countervailing power-type of cooperative. There are two major 
conditions under which this type of cooperative is viable. The first condition is that 
there exist economies of scale so that the average cost curve is continuously declining as 
the volume increases. The second condition is that the sales price of the cooperative is 
independent of the production volume, for instance because the government guarantees 
the prices. Consequently, it is in the interest of all members that production volume is 
kept as large as possible. Hence, countervailing power cooperatives have a volume 
maximisation goal and tend to be highly production oriented. Further, this type of co-
operative works very close to the members¶ own businesses and can be relatively easily 
controlled by their members. Since all investments of the cooperative are in activities 
close to the members, the portfolio problem²i.e. the problem that members have differ-
ing preferences concerning investments²tends to be minimal. Furthermore, the horizon 
problem becomes negligible since the investments from members are small. Normally, 
the desired payback periods for investments do not differ significantly between various 
segments of the members. Furthermore, there are minimal problems connected to an 
open membership policy, as non-member farmers would produce their volumes anyhow 
and therefore common property problems are relatively small. Under these conditions, 
the agency problems have been mostly negligible in Norwegian agricultural coopera-
tives. However, their golden age seems now to have reached an end, and the counter-
vailing power cooperative is expected to be gradually supplemented by more entrepre-
neurially oriented cooperatives. This type of cooperative is characterised by forward 
integration, the assumption of market risks and increased value-added component in the 
products. By processing the products several steps further, they can differentiate their 
production from their competitors and gain consumer loyalty with the aim of raising the 
price and profitability levels. Following van Bekkum et.al. (op.cit, p. 191), the follow-
ing bundle of problems are likely to emerge in entrepreneurially oriented cooperatives: 
The members cannot afford to raise the needed capital, so under-investments and 
non-optimal investments results. 
Large investments which, if they are financed by collective capital, distort internal 
prices significantly. 
Members would try to reap benefits without paying, i.e. they become free riders, and 
thus the incentive structure is distorted. 
Many investments are not in the interests of all members. 
Members have difficulties to monitor, control and assess the cooperative. 
There will be difficulties to attain the necessary streamlining of processing chains if 
the cooperative cannot control the quantity and quality of the members¶ production. 
 14
Cross-subsidisation between different groups of members will hamper the efficiency 
both at the member level and in the co-operative. 
 
To what extent does Norwegian cooperatives develop from ³countervailing power´-
models towards entrepreneur-oriented models, with the consequence that agency prob-
lems increase? The picture is complex, but some general trends can nevertheless be 
identified (R¡kholt and Borgen, 1998). Within fruit and vegetables, a sector in which 
the cooperative organisations traditionally have had a limited market share (approx. 
25%), the former Gartnerhallen was closed down in 1997, due to low productivity, low 
member engagement and unsatisfactory economic results. Gartnerhallen was exposed to 
the weaknesses of the traditional cooperative form, without being able to utilise its po-
tential benefits (R¡kholt, 1999). A new generation cooperative has now been estab-
lished, very much in line with the entrepreneurial cooperative. The new organisation 
(³Nye Gartnerhallen´) is directly integrated with a retailer chain through a long-term 
exclusive contract. The membership contract in the new cooperative is very demanding 
with respect to delivery precision, quality level etc. The two most influential producer 
cooperatives in Norway²the Meat producers¶ cooperatives and the Dairy coopera-
tives²are also in a period of rapid transition. A new governance structure has recently 
been agreed to in the Meat Processing cooperative. The most significant change is that 
the authority to make investment decisions is delegated to the apex of the cooperative. 
The rationale is to enable the cooperative to enhance its capability to move financial 
resources according to new industrial strategies, faster and more powerful than before. 
More advanced strategies for market development and specialisation of production are 
prepared also. Substantial financial amounts are used to further develop the brand image 
of the cooperative, in a severe competition with the private label strategy that is pursued 
by the retailer chains. Both the Meat producers¶ cooperative and the Dairy producers 
cooperative are preparing for a situation in which specialisation and the capability to 
pursue an aggressive investment strategy is a crucial competitive weapon. To accom-
plish this goal, less effort is undertaken to level out inequalities among members. The 
door is opened for more differentiated treatment of members, depending on their rela-
tive importance for the strength and survival of the cooperative. There are also some 
embryos of genuine novel cooperative organisations in Norway, organised around re-
gions, niches or production technology (e.g. ecological production types). It is too early 
to declare them as ³entrepreneurial cooperatives´, but they are definitively more likely 
to develop in that direction than to become similar to the countervailing power type of 
cooperative.  
The abovementioned pattern can also be traced in the form of changes in membership 
strategies, values and mentality. The more alike the members, the less likely that agency 
problems unfold in cooperatives. What today characterises the body of members of 
many cooperatives, however, is increasing diversity and intergenerational value differ-
ences. The new generation of farmers differ from their parental generation in many re-
spects. They are likely to be more influenced by modern trends within technology, con-
sumer patterns etc. In future, members will probably identify more with their specific 
type of production and close colleagues in the same niche than with the cooperative 
organization as such. Moreover, the investor-role may gradually be more focused, as a 
supplement to the role as user. The expansive farmers may insist on a more aggressive 
investment strategy than the other members. This too may contribute to make the mem-
bership body more heterogeneous and fragmented. The essential point to infer from this 
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is that agency problems are likely to increase in the Norwegian agricultural cooperatives 
in the close future. The discussion is summarised in Figure 3.1 below.  
 
  
190±1990 
 
 
After 1990 
Characteristics of the in-
terplay between the agri-
cultural cooperatives and 
their environment  
 
 
 
 
- The cooperative 
movement evolved as 
a solidary project run 
by farmers and the 
state  
- Environment under 
control, due to ad-
vanced national eco-
nomic planning ant the 
corporatist govern-
mental regime 
- Cooperatives gained 
legitimacy by virtue of 
their role as 
implementers of 
national agricultural 
policy 
- New political govern-
ance structure  
- Norwegian agriculture 
adapts to international 
trade agreements  
Characteristics of the co-
operative organization 
structure and operations 
 
 
- Agricultural coopera-
tives originated as 
³countervailing 
power´-movement  
  
- Entrepreneurial activi-
ties within the frame-
work of existing feder-
ate coops 
- New cooperatives 
emerge, with strong re-
semblance to the entre-
preneurial logic  
Characteristics of mem-
bership strategies and val-
ues  
 
 
 
- Active users, but pas-
sive investors  
- Membership moti-
vated by the need for 
selling farmers¶ goods, 
not to invest capital  
- New generation farm-
ers  
- More active members: 
both active users and 
active investors  
 
Significance of agency-
problems  
 
 
Mostly negligible  Likely to increase substan-
tially  
Figure 3.1 Changes in environment, organisation structure and membership values 
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We have critically discussed the extent and significance of agency-problems in the 
Norwegian agricultural producer cooperatives. To what extent does agency theory illu-
minate critical and strategic issues of Norwegian agricultural cooperatives? Our major 
conclusion is that traditionally, the agency problems have been negligible in Norwegian 
agricultural cooperatives, but the problems may become more challenging and pressing 
in the close future. Our attempt here to apply the agency theory to explore Norwegian 
cooperatives, is built on the premise that under certain conditions, the agency problems 
may become highly problematic in cooperative organizations and deeply affect their 
operations and structure. Our overall conclusion is that agency theory has relatively low 
explanatory power as applied to the evolvement of the Norwegian agricultural coopera-
tives up to approx. 1990, but may turn out to be a much more relevant and inspiring 
framework for the future analysis of these cooperatives.  
Implicitly, we have paid attention to several weaknesses of agency theory as a 
framework for understanding cooperative organisations. An institutional theory should 
offer an appreciation of the way in which specific historical structures shape economic 
behaviour (Robins, 1987). Agency theory seems not to be equipped to stand up to this 
expectation, for multiple causes. First, agency theory underestimates the significance of 
collective thinking and collective strategies in producer cooperatives. The historical 
roots and cultural heritage of Norwegian producer cooperatives make their collective 
thinking very strong. Second, the human model inherent in agency theory is an image of 
hyper-calculative individuals, who are abstracted and isolated from their contexts. In 
other words, agency theory assumes that principals and agents live in abstract environ-
ment, but neglect the processes by which specific environmental patterns also live in the 
minds of the actors. The relational aspects between members are treated in a cursory 
manner. No interest is devoted to solidaric behaviour, not to speak of altruistic thinking 
and strategies. The significance of institutional and cultural settings is treated incom-
pletely. Another issue is that the scope of agency theory is limited, so that the theory is 
unable to give a full treatment of the crucial question why cooperatives exist. To answer 
this question, it is far more relevant to draw on macro-oriented institutional theory as 
well as transaction cost economics, than on agency theory. Probably, cooperatives are 
so viable because the agricultural cooperatives in Norway have successfully solved the 
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transaction cost problem of their members. The cooperative membership has safe-
guarded the asset specific investments of the members. For decades, this protection has 
been offered by agricultural cooperatives in an intimate interplay with the political au-
thorities, due to the cooperatives¶ role as implementer of national, agricultural policy 
(R¡kholt and Borgen, 1998). Therefore, even though the agency problems may become 
substantial, they may still be negligible to the extent that they are outweighed by the 
cooperatives¶ ability to reduce the transaction costs of the members. Under these condi-
tions, members actively control the firm since it is meaningful for them.  
To sum up, an understanding of the agency problems is by far a complete frame of 
reference for a scholarly discussion of agricultural producer cooperatives. Despite the 
popularity of the new organizational economics, students of cooperatives are still dee-
med to live with theoretical eclecticism. 
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